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1 FEBRUARY 1971

DDCI SPEECH TO
"BONUS STRIKE '71" CONFERENCE

COMMUNIST STRATEGY IN THE 1970s

THE TOPIC FOR DISCUSSION HERE THIS MORNING IS, AS DESCRIBED IN YOUR PROGRAM, "COMMUNIST STRATEGY IN THE 1970's." THIS IS, OF COURSE, A WORTHY SUBJECT. BUT IT IS ALSO A PRETTY TALL ORDER. TO BEGIN WITH, IT IS NOT EASY TO PEER DOWN THE LONG, DARK CORRIDOR OF THE 1970'S AND PERCEIVE LIGHT--OR ANYTHING ELSE--DOWN THERE AT THE END OF THE DECADE. BUT MAINLY I AM CONCERNED ABOUT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE TERM "COMMUNIST STRATEGY": IT SUGGESTS THAT IN THE 1970'S THERE WILL BE SOMETHING INSTANTLY RECOGNIZABLE AS SUCH, AS THE STRATEGY OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. SURELY THIS WILL NOT BE THE CASE. DURING THE COMING DECADE, AS INDEED DURING THE ONE JUST COMPLETED, THERE WILL BE MORE THAN ONE KIND OF COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, AND EACH CAN BE EXPECTED TO FOLLOW MORE THAN ONE KIND OF STRATEGY.

THIS IS NOT AN IDLE POINT. IT MEANS THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL BE CONTENDING WITH A NUMBER OF

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DIFFERENT SORTS OF COMMUNISTS, IN A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT PLACES, AND THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL HAVE TO FORMULATE ITS STRATEGIES ACCORDINGLY. IT MAY BE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT OUR APPROACH TO THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS WILL NOT VERY MUCH RESEMBLE OUR APPROACH TO THE RUSSIAN COMMUNISTS. AND OUR APPROACH TO BOTH MAY BE GREATLY INFLUENCED BY THE STRATEGIES THAT EACH HAPPENS TO BE FOLLOWING TOWARD THE OTHER.

I DO NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST TO YOU THAT WE NEED TAKE A GREAT DEAL OF COMFORT FROM THIS. TRUE, IN SOME WAYS, ENMITY BETWEEN CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION CAN BE VERY HELPFUL TO US. TO THE EXTENT THAT MOSCOW IS MAKING MISCHIEF FOR PEKING, IT IS PERHAPS DIVERTED FROM THE EFFORT TO STIR UP TROUBLE FOR US. AND VICE VERSA. BUT THERE IS NO DENYING THE FACT THAT BOTH COUNTRIES STILL VERY MUCH DISLIKE THE UNITED STATES, EVEN WHILE THEY ARE SO BUSY DISLIKING EACH OTHER. AND THERE IS NO DENYING THAT THE EXISTENCE OF A VARIETY OF COMMUNISTS FOLLOWING A VARIETY OF STRATEGIES THROUGHOUT THE WORLD WILL MAKE INTERNATIONAL LIFE FOR THE UNITED STATES HIGHLY COMPLICATED AND OFTEN VERY UNPLEASANT.

STILL, IT IS THE SOVIET UNION WHICH IS LIKELY TO RECEIVE THE FOCUS OF OUR ATTENTION DURING THE

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COMING DECADE. THE REALITIES OF POWER WILL INSURE THIS. AND SO, RATHER THAN DISCUSSING THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF COMMUNIST STRATEGIES, I SUGGEST THAT, INSTEAD, WE CONCENTRATE TODAY ON THE USSR, WHICH IS THE MOST INTERESTING AND MOST IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THAT PROBLEM.

TO SURVEY THE FULL SCOPE OF THE ACTIVITIES AND ATTITUDES OF ALL THE VARIOUS COMMUNIST STATES WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE IN ANY CASE IN THE TIME AVAILABLE TO US. I FEAR I THUS MUST SLIGHT CHINESE STRATEGIES, CUBAN STRATEGIES, YUGOSLAV STRATEGIES, TROTSKYITE STRATEGIES, EVEN--IF YOU LIKE--CHILEAN STRATEGIES. BUT I HOPE YOU WILL FIND THIS CONCENTRATION ON THE SOVIET PROBLEM AN APPROPRIATE AND REWARDING EXERCISE. I PLAN, IN ANY CASE, TO PROCEED ALONG THE LINE OF MARCH SUGGESTED TO ME BY MY HOSTS: FIRST, TO EXAMINE BRIEFLY THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET THREAT; SECOND, TO CONSIDER SOVIET OBJECTIVES OF PARTICULAR INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES; THIRD, TO DISCUSS SOVIET CAPABILITIES, PRINCIPALLY MILITARY; AND THEN, FINALLY, IN A GENERAL WAY, TO TALK BRIEFLY ABOUT SOVIET POLICIES AND US POLICIES AND THE INTERACTION BETWEEN THE TWO.

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~~TOP SECRET~~THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET THREAT

I WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN WITH A COMMONPLACE: THE SOVIET THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES IS BROAD GAUGE. IT IS POLITICAL. IT IS MILITARY. IT IS IDEOLOGICAL. IT IS ALSO ECONOMIC AND SUBVERSIVE. COMPETITION AND CONTENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR EXIST IN MOST REGIONS OF THE WORLD, AND ASSUME A GREAT VARIETY OF FORMS. IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER THEY AFFECT VIRTUALLY ALL AREAS OF INTERNATIONAL LIFE, AND NOT A FEW OF DOMESTIC LIFE IN THE US AND THE USSR AS WELL.

THERE ARE THREE VERY SIMPLE TRUTHS ABOUT THE USSR WHICH HELP TO EXPLAIN WHY ALL THIS IS SO. IT IS, FIRST OF ALL, A GREAT POWER, A WORLD POWER--ONE OF ONLY TWO STATES WHICH CAN CLAIM THAT DISTINCTION. IT IS, SECONDLY, AN AMBITIOUS POWER, A FORWARD-MOVING, THRUSTING POWER, MUCH INTERESTED IN ENLARGING ITS GLOBAL POSITION. AND, THIRDLY, IN PART BECAUSE OF ITS EXPERIENCES WITH HISTORY, IN PART BECAUSE OF ITS IDEOLOGICAL OUTLOOK, IT IS A HOSTILE AND SUSPICIOUS POWER.

THERE ARE, AT THE SAME TIME, SOME OTHER, OFFSETTING TRUTHS ABOUT THE USSR. THERE ARE LIMITS TO SOVIET POWER, AND THERE ARE CONSTRAINTS ON THE

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WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY OF THE SOVIET UNION TO USE THAT POWER. ONE OF THESE CONSTRAINTS IS, OF COURSE, THE UNITED STATES. ANOTHER, RELATED EXTERNAL RESTRAINT IS WHAT HAS BEEN CALLED THE "BALANCE OF TERROR," BUT WHICH FOR PRESENT PURPOSES CAN SIMPLY BE DESCRIBED AS THE SOVIET UNION'S UNDERSTANDABLE DETERMINATION TO SURVIVE. ANOTHER CONSTRAINT, AS I HAVE ALREADY INDICATED, IS CHINA. YET ANOTHER IS THE USSR'S TROUBLESOME POSITION IN EASTERN EUROPE.

AND THERE ARE A VARIETY OF ESSENTIALLY INTERNAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND APPREHENSIONS WHICH ALSO ENCOURAGE THE SOVIET LEADERS TO MOVE ABOUT IN THE WORLD WITH AT LEAST SOME DEGREE OF CAUTION. AMONG THESE ARE DOMESTIC ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES, INCLUDING A LONG-TERM DECLINE IN THE RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH WHICH MAKES EVEN TOUGHER THE OLD PROBLEM OF HOW TO DIVIDE UP THE NATIONAL RESOURCE PIE. (THIS, I NEED HARDLY MENTION, IS A PROBLEM MORE THAN SLIGHTLY FAMILIAR TO THOSE OF US HERE TODAY.) THE SOVIET ECONOMY IS LARGE, OF COURSE, AND IT CAN AND DOES SUPPORT AN ENORMOUS MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT AND THE WORLD POWER COMPETITION WITH THE UNITED STATES. IT HAS TO DO THIS, HOWEVER, ON AN ECONOMIC BASE JUST HALF THE SIZE OF OURS AND THE CONSEQUENT ECONOMIC STRAINS

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ARE SERIOUS AND SEEM TO BE GROWING. THE EXISTENCE OF THESE STRAINS DOES NOT LEAD TO THE IMPOSITION OF HARD LIMITS ON SOVIET MILITARY BUDGETS, OR, NECESSARILY, TO CURBS ON SOVIET INTERNATIONAL AMBITIONS. BUT SERIOUS EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH THESE STRAINS INCLINE THE LEADERS--OR AT LEAST SOME OF THEM--IN PRECISELY THESE DIRECTIONS.

ANOTHER FACTOR WHICH BENDS THE SOVIETS TOWARD PRUDENCE IN THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES IS POLITICAL IN ORIGIN. THE RULERS OF THE SOVIET UNION ARE POLITICALLY INSECURE. THEY DO NOT TRUST EACH OTHER. THEY DO NOT TRUST THE SOVIET PEOPLE. THEY GOVERN IN ARBITRARY AND OFTEN INEFFICIENT WAYS, AND MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE, THEY ARE DEDICATED TO THE PRESERVATION OF THEIR OWN POWERS AND THEIR OWN PRIVILEGES. IT IS NO WONDER, THEN, THAT A MAJOR PREOCCUPATION OF THESE RULERS IS INTERNAL SECURITY--BOTH THEIR INDIVIDUAL SECURITY, AND THE SECURITY OF THE SYSTEM AS A WHOLE. SUCCESSES IN FOREIGN POLICY CAN EASE DOMESTIC STRAINS AND STRENGTHEN INTERNAL SECURITY. SETBACKS IN FOREIGN POLICY, HOWEVER, CAN INCREASE DOMESTIC STRESS AND THREATEN POLITICAL STABILITY AT THE TOP. ON BALANCE, THEN, THE INTERNAL POLITICAL CONCERNS OF THE SOVIET LEADERS MOVE THEM TO AVOID

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POLICIES OF GREAT RISK, POLICIES WHICH THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES REFER TO AS "ADVENTURIST."

THIS DOES NOT, OF COURSE, MEAN THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS WILL IN ALL CASES ELECT THE SAFEST COURSE. OBVIOUSLY, THE SOVIETS ARE FROM TIME TO TIME WILLING TO RUN SERIOUS RISKS OF ONE KIND OR ANOTHER, AND THEY CAN RUN SERIOUS RISKS WITHOUT RECOGNIZING THEM IN ADVANCE--THEY CAN MISCALCULATE AS WELL AS ANYBODY ELSE. MY POINT IS ONLY THAT THE PRESENT LEADERS SEEM TO RECOGNIZE THAT BAD NEWS FROM ABROAD CAN ALSO MEAN BAD NEWS AT HOME. CERTAINLY THIS IS ONE OF THE LESSONS THEY DREW FROM THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS. KHRUSHCHEV, WHO WAS VIEWED BY HIS COLLEAGUES AS SOMETHING OF AN ADVENTURER, PAID A HEAVY PRICE FOR THE FAILURE OF HIS MISSILE VENTURE INTO CUBA; HE LOST POWER IN ITS IMMEDIATE WAKE AND, EVENTUALLY--PARTLY BECAUSE OF THAT FAILURE--LOST HIS JOB COMPLETELY. (AND HE WAS LUCKY, PERHAPS, THAT HE DIDN'T LOSE HIS HEAD AS WELL.)

THERE IS, I THINK, ONE WORD WHICH BEST DESCRIBES SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY IN GENERAL AND, AS A COROLLARY, THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET THREAT. THE WORD IS OPPORTUNISTIC. THE SOVIETS PREFER TO ADVANCE INTERNATIONALLY UNDER CONDITIONS OF CONTROLLED RISK, AND THEY WOULD RATHER MOVE INTO A VACUUM THAN INTO A CONFRONTATION.

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IF SOVIET POLICY IS OPPORTUNISTIC, THEN IT WOULD FOLLOW THAT IT IS ALSO MORE PRAGMATIC THAN IDEOLOGICAL. THIS IS, IN FACT, THE CASE. IN MOST RESPECTS, THE USSR TENDS TO BEHAVE MUCH MORE AS A WORLD POWER THAN AS THE CENTER OF WORLD REVOLUTION. IDEOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN RECENT YEARS HAVE COME TO PLAY A PROGRESSIVELY SMALLER ROLE IN THE FORMULATION OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICIES. THUS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP VIEWS ITS RELATIONS WITH CLIENT STATES (SUCH AS THE UAR) AND POTENTIAL CLIENT STATES (LIKE INDIA) MORE IN THE LIGHT OF SOVIET NATIONAL INTERESTS THAN FOR WHAT THEY CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THE ADVANCE OF COMMUNISM. MORE OFTEN THAN NOT, IT CONCENTRATES ON TRYING TO SWAY A NON-COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT, RATHER THAN SEEKING TO OVERTHROW IT. ALSO THE PRESENT KREMLIN LEADERS ARE MORE INCLINED THAN THEIR PREDECESSORS TO PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH TRADITIONAL RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICAL INTERESTS, AND WITH A SOMEWHAT MORE REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF THE POSSIBILITIES FOR THE EXPANSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE. THEY THEREFORE TEMPER THEIR AMBITIONS BOTH WITH ESTIMATES OF OPPORTUNITY, AND WITH CALCULATIONS OF POWER AND RISK.

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SOVIET OBJECTIVES

WOULD THAT WE WERE PRIVY TO THESE SAME ESTIMATES AND CALCULATIONS! BUT, OF COURSE, ORDINARILY WE ARE NOT. NEVERTHELESS, WE DO KNOW SOMETHING ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM, AND ABOUT THE WAY THE SOVIETS ARE INCLINED TO LOOK AT THE WORLD. WE CAN, MOREOVER, OBSERVE THE USSR'S CONDUCT AND MAKE JUDGMENTS ABOUT ITS OBJECTIVES AND ITS CAPABILITIES TO ACHIEVE THOSE OBJECTIVES.

WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS HAVE DRAWN UP ANY FORMAL TIMETABLE OF ACCOMPLISHMENT, OR EVEN ANY VERY FORMAL LIST OF PRIORITIES. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT LIKE MOST COUNTRIES THE USSR TENDS TO LOOK AT THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE IN THE LIGHT OF ITS PRESUMED PRIORITY NATIONAL INTERESTS. IN THIS CONTEXT, MOSCOW SEES AS MOST CRITICAL ITS RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, ITS CONCERNS IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE, AND ITS CONFLICT WITH COMMUNIST CHINA:

-- PUT VERY BROADLY, THE SOVIETS VIEW THE UNITED STATES AS THEIR PRINCIPAL COMPETITOR AND ADVERSARY, AND AS THE ONLY POWER WHICH COULD SERIOUSLY THREATEN THE VERY EXISTENCE OF THE SOVIET UNION.

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- THEY NOW LOOK UPON CHINA IN A NOT TOTALLY DISSIMILAR FASHION; THAT IS, AS A COMPETITOR AND ADVERSARY AND--POTENTIALLY--AS A MILITARY THREAT AS WELL. OF COURSE, CHINA'S POSITION AS A RIVAL COMMUNIST POWER, AND ITS ABILITY TO CHALLENGE THE USSR'S PRETENSIONS TO LEADERSHIP OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, ADD AN EXTRA DIMENSION TO THE SINO-SOVIET STRUGGLE.
- FINALLY, AMONG THESE TOP PRIORITY SOVIET CONCERNS AND OBJECTIVES, THE SOVIETS PERCEIVE OF EASTERN EUROPE AND THE SOVIET POSITION IN EAST GERMANY AS A VITAL NATIONAL INTEREST. THIS IS NOT ONLY A CONSEQUENCE OF GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY AND WHAT MIGHT BE CALLED THE HABIT OF EMPIRE--IT ALSO REFLECTS A GENERAL SOVIET PRE-OCCUPATION WITH EUROPE AS A WHOLE.

THE SOVIETS APPARENTLY LOOK UPON THEIR INTERESTS AND OBJECTIVES ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD AS SOMEWHAT LOWER ON THE SCALE OF PRIORITIES. THIS MAY SEEM AN

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ODD THING TO SAY IN VIEW OF THE SIZE AND SCOPE OF CURRENT SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE MEDITERRANEAN. BUT I DO NOT MEAN TO IMPLY ANY LACK OF ACTIVE SOVIET CONCERN AND EFFORT IN THIS AREA. ON THE CONTRARY, HERE IS AN AREA WHERE OPPORTUNITY CLEARLY BECKONED, WHERE PROSPECTS FOR THE EXPANSION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE AND POWER, AT WESTERN EXPENSE, SEEMED ESPECIALLY PROMISING. AND HERE IS AN AREA WHICH MOSCOW THINKS OF AS VERY IMPORTANT IN GEOPOLITICAL AND STRATEGIC TERMS AND AS A MAJOR ARENA OF THE EAST-WEST STRUGGLE AS A WHOLE. DESPITE ALL THIS, HOWEVER, MOSCOW DOES NOT CONCEIVE OF ITS POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS ABSOLUTELY VITAL--THAT IS, AS CRUCIAL TO THE USSR'S NATIONAL SURVIVAL.

THERE ARE, OF COURSE, STILL OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD WHERE THE SOVIETS HOPE TO REMAIN ACTIVE. INDEED, THE USSR AS A GLOBAL POWER WANTS--AS THE NAME IMPLIES--TO BE ACTIVE JUST ABOUT EVERYWHERE. BUT FOR THE MOST PART, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, MOST OF LATIN AMERICA, AND MOST OF THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC ARE REGARDED AS AREAS OF SECONDARY CONCERN.

WE CAN USE THIS GENERAL CONCEPT OF PRIORITIES IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AS A GUIDE TO HOW THE SOVIETS MIGHT APPROACH A PARTICULAR PROBLEM IN A GIVEN AREA.

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THE USSR WOULD OBVIOUSLY REACT MOST SHARPLY, AND RUN THE HIGHEST RISKS, IN CONFLICT SITUATIONS ON ITS OWN IMMEDIATE PERIPHERY, OR WHICH IN SOME OTHER WAY SEEMED TO JEOPARDIZE WHAT THE SOVIETS BELIEVE TO BE THE MOST CRITICAL ELEMENTS OF THEIR NATIONAL SECURITY. THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA COMES TO MIND. SO DOES THE GRADUAL BUT MASSIVE BUILDUP OF SOVIET ARMED STRENGTH ALONG THE CHINESE BORDER, WHERE RUSSIAN FORCES HAVE MORE THAN TRIPLED SINCE 1965. AND, TO USE A HYPOTHETICAL CASE, IF THERE WERE LARGE-SCALE FIGHTING BETWEEN, SAY, EAST AND WEST GERMANY, THIS WOULD THREATEN VITAL SOVIET INTERESTS AND WE WOULD EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO REACT ACCORDINGLY.

IT IS MORE DIFFICULT TO GAUGE LIKELY SOVIET REACTIONS TO CRISES IN AREAS WHERE SOVIET INTERESTS ARE HIGHLY IMPORTANT BUT NOT VITAL. THE SOVIET POSITION IN EGYPT IS A CASE IN POINT. TO MOSCOW, THE PRESERVATION OF THIS POSITION WOULD NOT BE WORTH THE SERIOUS RISK OF GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR. BUT WHAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT DO SHORT OF RUNNING SUCH A RISK IS A GOOD QUESTION. SO, TOO, IS HOW THE SOVIETS MIGHT IN FACT MEASURE THE RISKS.

HISTORY MAY PROVIDE US WITH SOME CLUES. IN 1967, WHEN THE ISRAELIS MOVED RAPIDLY INTO THE

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SINAI, WIPING UP THE EGYPTIANS AS THEY WENT, THE SOVIET POSITION IN THE UAR WAS IN REAL JEOPARDY. MOSCOW--IT DEVELOPED--WAS NOT AT ALL WILLING TO RUN MAJOR RISKS IN ORDER TO SAVE IT. BUT HOW RELIABLE A GUIDE WOULD THIS BE IF THE SAME SORT OF THING HAPPENED AGAIN? THE USSR'S INVESTMENTS IN THE UAR--ESPECIALLY ITS MILITARY AND POLITICAL INVESTMENTS--ARE MUCH LARGER TODAY THAN THEY WERE IN 1967. AT THE SAME TIME, THE USSR'S STRATEGIC STRENGTH VIS-A-VIS THE UNITED STATES HAS ALSO INCREASED. SO WHAT HAPPENED THREE AND A HALF YEARS AGO MIGHT NOT, IN THE EVENT, PROVIDE US WITH A VERY RELIABLE GUIDE AFTER ALL.

IN AREAS OF LESSER CONSEQUENCE TO THE SOVIETS, WE ARE BACK ON SAFER GROUND IN SEEKING TO ASSESS SOVIET POLICIES AND RESPONSES. THE SOVIET UNION IS READY--THOUGH NOT ALWAYS VERY QUICK--TO CAPITALIZE ON OPPORTUNITIES TO EXPAND ITS INFLUENCE OR TO EXTEND ITS INFLUENCE INTO PREVIOUSLY DENIED AREAS. IT IS ALSO WILLING TO RUN SOME RISKS ON THE SCENE. THUS THE SOVIETS MOVED INTO NIGERIA DURING THAT COUNTRY'S RECENT CIVIL WAR, BUT THEY CAREFULLY LIMITED THEIR COMMITMENTS, AND THEY MADE SURE THE RISKS WERE LOCAL, NOT INTERNATIONAL.

SOVIET CAPABILITIES

TO PUT SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN RATHER GROSS TERMS, THE USSR WANTS TO SURVIVE, AND IT WISHES TO EXPAND ITS POWER AND INFLUENCE IN THE WORLD. IT MAY BE THAT MANY SOVIETS--BELIEVING THESE TWO GOALS TO BE VIRTUALLY INDISTINGUISHABLE--ARE CONVINCED THAT THE SOVIET UNION MUST, IN EFFECT, EXPAND IF IT IS TO SURVIVE. TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY STILL FEEL HEMMED IN BY HOSTILE FORCES, AND TO THE EXTENT THAT THEY STILL FEEL THEMSELVES TO REPRESENT THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE, THIS IS PROBABLY PRETTY MUCH THE CASE.

IT MAY ALSO BE TRUE THAT THE SOVIETS ARE BEGINNING TO THINK ABOUT THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN MUCH THE SAME WAY. IT HAS OFTEN BEEN SAID THAT THE SOVIETS ARE DEFENSIVELY ORIENTED AND, HISTORICALLY, THERE IS SOMETHING TO THIS. FOR EXAMPLE, BACK IN THE LATE 1940'S AND EARLY 1950'S THEY BEGAN TO POUR BILLIONS AND BILLIONS INTO AIR DEFENSE--FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES, AND THE LARGEST AND MOST ELABORATE RADAR DEFENSE SYSTEM EVER DEVISED. THEY DID THIS, IN THE FACE OF OUR LONG RANGE BOMBERS, RATHER THAN TRYING TO BUILD UP AN OFFENSIVE BOMBER FORCE EVEN REMOTELY COMPARABLE TO SAC.

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BUT IF IT IS TRUE THAT THE SOVIETS ONCE GAVE AN OVERRIDING PRIORITY TO DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES, THIS IS SURELY NO LONGER THE CASE. HAVING ACHIEVED THE MEANS OF SURVIVAL, AND THEN HAVING BUILT UP A CREDIBLE STRATEGIC DETERRENCE, THEY CERTAINLY DID NOT STOP THERE. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY WENT ON, AND THEY WENT ON IN A BIG WAY: A MASSIVE FORCE OF ICBMs; A DEVELOPING FLEET OF POLARIS TYPE SUBMARINES; AN EXPANDING SURFACE FLEET; A GROWING AIRLIFT CAPACITY; NOT TO MENTION LARGE AND INCREASINGLY FLEXIBLE GROUND FORCES. CLEARLY, THE USSR HAS BECOME A GLOBAL POWER, WITH GLOBAL INTERESTS AND STRENGTHS AND FORMIDABLE OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES. BUT I'LL GIVE YOU ODDS THAT IF YOU ASKED HIM, A SOVIET MARSHAL WOULD TELL YOU--AND WOULD MEAN IT--THAT THE SOVIET POSTURE WAS STILL ESSENTIALLY DEFENSIVE BECAUSE THE USSR'S VERY SURVIVAL DEPENDED ULTIMATELY ON ITS ABILITY TO MAINTAIN AND PERHAPS EXPAND ITS MILITARY POWER ON A GLOBAL BASIS.

WELL THEN, ASIDE FROM RATIONALIZATIONS OF THAT NATURE, WHY DID THE USSR DECIDE TO DEVELOP ALL THIS STRENGTH? CERTAINLY IT IS NOT THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS PLAN TO GO OUT TOMORROW TO CONQUER THE WORLD. PARTLY, IT IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE IN A

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COMPETITION WITH US. THEY DO NOT WANT TO BE SECOND BEST. THEY DO NOT WISH, FOR EXAMPLE, TO GRANT THE UNITED STATES EXCLUSIVE NAVAL RIGHTS TO THE MEDITERRANEAN. PARTLY IT IS THE CONSEQUENCE OF MILITARY PRUDENCE, THAT IS, THE DESIRE OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS TO BE PREPARED FOR JUST ABOUT ANYTHING: A GROUND ATTACK BY NATO, FOR EXAMPLE, OR A GROUND ATTACK BY THE CHINESE OR--NIGHTMARE OF NIGHTMARES--BOTH. PARTLY IT IS THE RESULT OF A DESIRE TO BE ABLE TO SUPPORT CLIENT STATES (LIKE THE UAR AGAIN) WHEN THEY ARE IN NEED. AND IN PART--IN FACT, IN LARGE PART--IT HAS ALSO COME ABOUT BECAUSE THE SOVIETS CONCEIVE OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN A VERY POLITICAL WAY. THEY GIVE GREAT WEIGHT IN THEIR FOREIGN POLICY CALCULATIONS AND--IN THEIR CONSIDERATIONS OF THE SO-CALLED BALANCE OF FORCES--TO THE POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT AND USEFULNESS OF MILITARY POWER. THE RED ARMY IS, IF YOU LIKE, A POLITICAL WEAPON AS WELL AS A MILITARY ONE. AND, THOUGH IN A VERY MUCH MORE SPECIALIZED AND ESOTERIC WAY, SO TOO IS THEIR BIG MISSILE, THE SS-9.

HAVING SAID ALL THIS, LET ME NOW REVIEW WITH YOU OUR LATEST ESTIMATES OF SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTHS IN KEY FIELDS, BEGINNING WITH SOVIET STRATEGIC STRENGTH.

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IN THE COURSE OF THE PAST 10 YEARS, THE USSR HAS ENGAGED IN A VIGOROUS AND COSTLY BUILDUP OF ITS INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK FORCES--PRINCIPALLY ICBMs AND SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILES. WHILE TOTAL DEFENSE SPENDING INCREASED STEADILY DURING THE PERIOD, THE SHARE ALLOCATED TO THESE FORCES DOUBLED, GOING FROM ABOUT 5 PERCENT IN 1960 TO MORE THAN 10 PERCENT IN THE LATER YEARS OF THE DECADE. THE LEVEL IN 1969--2.3 BILLION RUBLES, OR THE EQUIVALENT OF \$5.6 BILLION--WAS MORE THAN THREE TIMES AS HIGH AS THE 1960 LEVEL. FOR THE DECADE AS A WHOLE, SPENDING ON INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK FORCES--NOT INCLUDING THE COST OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT--ACCUMULATED TO ABOUT 16 BILLION RUBLES OR SOME \$36 BILLION. ICBMs ACCOUNTED FOR ABOUT 80 PERCENT OF THIS.

AS A RESULT OF ALL THIS EFFORT, THE SOVIETS ON OCTOBER FIRST, 1970, HAD AN ESTIMATED 1,300 OR SO OPERATIONAL LAUNCHERS AT ICBM COMPLEXES, AND BY MID-1972 THEY WILL HAVE ABOUT 1,450. OF THESE, ABOUT 300 WILL BE THE LARGE SS-9 TYPE, AND SOME 850 THE SMALLER SS-11. THE REMAINDER WILL CONSIST OF OLDER SS-7 AND SS-8 MISSILES, AND 80 OR SO OF THE SMALL, SOLID-PROPELLANT SS-13s.

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WHILE THE ICBM PROGRAMS WERE UNDER WAY, THE SOVIETS WERE ALSO ENERGETICALLY DEVELOPING NUCLEAR-POWERED, BALLISTIC-MISSILE-FIRING SUBMARINES. OF THESE THE MOST NOTABLE IS THE Y-CLASS, WHICH, LIKE THE US POLARIS, HAS 16 TUBES FOR LAUNCHING MISSILES. THE MISSILE PRESENTLY CARRIED BY THIS CLASS HAS A RANGE OF ABOUT 1,300 NAUTICAL MILES, AND THE WAR-HEAD YIELD IS BETWEEN 0.6 AND 1.2 MEGATONS. Y-CLASS SUBMARINES ARE NOW BEING PRODUCED AT A RATE OF SEVEN OR EIGHT A YEAR; THERE ARE, WE THINK, 14 NOW OPERATIONAL. IN ADDITION TO THE Y-CLASS, THERE ARE SUBMARINES OF EARLIER DESIGN WHICH COULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO THE INTERCONTINENTAL ATTACK MISSION.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE, IT SEEMS CLEAR THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS INTEND TO MAINTAIN AT A MINIMUM SUFFICIENT FORCES TO CONTINUE TO GIVE THEM--IN THEIR OWN PHRASE--A SENSE OF "EQUAL SECURITY" WITH THE US. ONE METHOD OF DOING SO MIGHT BE THROUGH AN ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT. THEY APPEAR SERIOUSLY INTERESTED IN THIS POSSIBILITY, BUT WE CANNOT FORESEE WHETHER AN AGREEMENT WILL BE REACHED, OR ON WHAT TERMS.

THE GENERAL ATTITUDES AND POLICIES OF THE USSR BEING WHAT THEY ARE, IT MIGHT SEEM OBVIOUS TO INFER

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THAT THE SOVIET LEADERS WILL STRIVE TO ACHIEVE MARKED SUPERIORITY OVER THE UNITED STATES IN STRATEGIC WEAPONRY. WE DO NOT DOUBT THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO ATTAIN SUCH A POSITION. WE DO QUESTION THAT THEY CONSIDER IT A FEASIBLE OBJECTIVE--THAT THEY BELIEVE THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS GOOD ENOUGH TO JUSTIFY ALLOCATION OF THE NECESSARY RESOURCES, ADJUSTMENT TO THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF AN ALL-OUT ARMS RACE, AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE RISK THAT INSTEAD OF SURPASSING THE U.S., THEY MIGHT FALL BEHIND, ESPECIALLY IN THE TECHNOLOGICAL COMPETITION.

BUT EVEN IF SOVIET INTENTIONS GO NO FURTHER THAN MAINTENANCE OF "EQUAL SECURITY," THEIR ARMS PROGRAMS ARE BOUND TO BE VIGOROUS AND DEMANDING. THIS IS IN PART BECAUSE SOVIET LEADERS MUST HAVE AN EYE, NOT TO WHAT FORCES THE U.S. HAS AT PRESENT, BUT TO WHAT IT CAN HAVE, OR MAY HAVE, IN FUTURE YEARS. IN THIS RESPECT THEY ARE LIKELY TO BE CAUTIOUS--TO OVER-ESTIMATE RATHER THAN UNDERESTIMATE FUTURE U.S. POWER. MOREOVER, THE WEAPONS COMPETITION NOWADAYS IS LARGELY A TECHNOLOGICAL RACE; EACH SIDE IS IMPELLED TO PRESS FORWARD ITS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, LEST IT BE LEFT BEHIND.

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BUT, CLEARLY, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS DO NOT PLAN TO PUT ALL THEIR EGGS INTO THE STRATEGIC BASKET. KHRUSHCHEV ONCE TRIED TO DO THIS--PARTLY BECAUSE HE THOUGHT IT MADE GOOD SENSE, AND PARTLY BECAUSE HE THOUGHT IT WAS A GOOD WAY TO SAVE MONEY--BUT THE PRESENT LEADERS HAVE REJECTED KHRUSHCHEV'S THEORIES. THEY HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED, APPARENTLY, WITH CONCEPTS DEVELOPED IN THIS COUNTRY CONCERNING THE DESIRABILITY OF MEANS FOR A FLEXIBLE RESPONSE. THEY HAVE ALSO BEEN IMPRESSED WITH OUR ABILITY TO USE MILITARY POWER IN SO MANY AREAS AND IN SO MANY WAYS. (MOST RECENTLY, FOR EXAMPLE, THEY SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN QUITE APPREHENSIVE ABOUT POSSIBLE U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE JORDANIAN CIVIL WAR; AMONG OTHER THINGS, THEY KNEW THAT WE COULD INTERVENE, IN FORCE AND WITH GREAT SPEED.)

IN ANY CASE, THE SOVIETS ARE TRYING TO IMPROVE THEIR OWN CAPACITY TO RESPOND FLEXIBLY. THEY ARE ALSO PLACING GREATER EMPHASIS ON THEIR ABILITY TO INTERVENE IN DISTANT AREAS, ADDING TO THEIR AIR AND SEA LIFT CAPABILITIES, BEEFING UP THEIR NAVAL INFANTRY, STRENGTHENING THEIR SURFACE FLEETS, AND ACQUIRING PORT FACILITIES--OR TRYING TO ACQUIRE SUCH FACILITIES--IN THE MEDITERRANEAN, THE INDIAN

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OCEAN, AND THE CARIBBEAN.

BUT THE SOVIETS HAVE A LONG WAY TO GO BEFORE THEY COULD HOPE TO EQUAL OUR CAPABILITIES FOR INTERVENTION IN DISTANT AREAS. IT MAY BE THAT THEY DO NOT FEEL THAT OVER-ALL EQUALITY IS NECESSARY. THEY SHOW NO PARTICULAR INTEREST, FOR EXAMPLE, IN LARGE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS. IT MAY ALSO BE THAT THEY SIMPLY DO NOT THINK THAT AN ALL-OUT EFFORT WOULD BE FEASIBLE; MOSCOW STILL GIVES PRIORITY TO ITS THEATER FORCES--THAT IS, TO ITS STRENGTHS VIS-A-VIS NATO IN THE WEST, AND CHINA IN THE EAST.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

I HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING THE GENERAL SHAPE OF THE SOVIET THREAT, THE NATURE OF SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THE WORLD AT LARGE, AND THE CHARACTER OF SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES WHICH HELP TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THIS THREAT AND PROVIDE A PART OF THE WHEREWITHAL FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE OBJECTIVES. NOW I WOULD LIKE BRIEFLY, IN CONCLUSION, TO CONSIDER SOME OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALL THIS FOR THE UNITED STATES.

THE CHOICES THE SOVIETS WILL MAKE DURING THE COMING DECADE WILL DEPEND IN SOME CONSIDERABLE DEGREE ON THIS COUNTRY. WHAT WE DO WILL AFFECT WHAT THEY DO. AND IT IS MUCH THE SAME IN REVERSE--HOW

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THEY CONDUCT THEMSELVES WILL OBVIOUSLY INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF U.S. POLICY.

AS MUCH AS ONE KNOWS ABOUT ONE'S OWN COUNTRY, IT TAKES A VENTURESOME MIND INDEED TO PREDICT THE PATH OF AMERICAN POLICY IN THE DECADE AHEAD. A MAJOR ISSUE WILL BE HOW WE WEIGH THE RELATIVE PRIORITY OF DOMESTIC CONCERNS AGAINST THOSE OF OUR WORLD INVOLVEMENT. THE U.S. DECISION ON THIS BASIC ISSUE WILL DETERMINE IN SOME LARGE MEASURE WHAT OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES THE SOVIET UNION PERCEIVES. HOW WE RESPOND TO THEIR MOVES, HOW WE COUNTER THEIR CAPABILITIES, HOW WE ACT IN GENERAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE WILL HAVE A GREAT DEAL TO DO WITH THEIR FOREIGN POLICY, ITS SUCCESSES AND ITS FAILURES.

BUT THIS IS NOT THE WHOLE STORY BY ANY MEANS. THERE ARE OTHER IMponderables AND CONSIDERATIONS WHICH WILL AFFECT NOT ONLY THE CHARACTER OF THE U.S.-SOVIET STRUGGLE, BUT WORLD POLITICS AS A WHOLE. HENRY KISSINGER HAS SAID THAT "THE AGE OF THE SUPER-POWERS IS NOW DRAWING TO AN END."

"THE PARADOX OF CONTEMPORARY MILITARY STRENGTH (KISSINGER WRITES) IS THAT WHILE THE MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS ARE CAPABLE

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OF DEVASTATING EACH OTHER, THEY HAVE GREAT DIFFICULTY TRANSLATING THIS CAPABILITY INTO POLICY--EXCEPT TO PREVENT DIRECT CHALLENGES TO THEIR OWN SURVIVAL. THE CAPACITY TO DESTROY IS DIFFICULT TO TRANSLATE INTO A PLAUSIBLE THREAT, EVEN AGAINST COUNTRIES WITH NO CAPACITY FOR RETALIATION. THE MARGIN OF SUPERIORITY OF THE SUPERPOWERS OVER THE OTHER STATES IS WIDENING; YET OTHER NATIONS HAVE UNPRECEDENTED SCOPE FOR AUTONOMOUS ACTION. IN OTHER WORDS, POWER NO LONGER TRANSLATES AUTOMATICALLY INTO INFLUENCE."

THUS, WE MIGHT SAY, EVEN IF SOME FORM OF MILITARY BIPOLARITY CONTINUES, EVEN IF THE U.S. AND THE USSR REMAIN SUPERPOWERS MILITARILY, THEY ARE NOT LIKELY TO REMAIN SUPERPOWERS POLITICALLY. INTERNATIONAL LIFE WILL INCREASINGLY REFLECT THE STRIVINGS AND APPREHENSIONS AND JEALOUSIES AND CONFLICTS OF MANY NATIONS, AND THE U.S. AND THE USSR WILL FIND THEMSELVES HAVING TO RESPOND MORE AND MORE TO THESE PROBLEMS AND THESE COUNTRIES. AND THUS INTERNATIONAL LIFE WILL NO LONGER BE SHAPED AS MUCH AS IT ONCE WAS SOLEY BY AMERICA AND RUSSIA, AND BY

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THE INTERACTION OF U.S. AND SOVIET POLICIES.

STILL, I WOULD LIKE TO LEAVE YOU WITH A FINAL ESTIMATE ABOUT SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE 1970'S. BARRING A MAJOR WAR, BARRING IMPORTANT THREATS TO INTERNAL STABILITY IN EITHER THE U.S. OR THE USSR, AND BARRING SOME FORM OF A REALLY BASIC ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT, THE SOVIET-AMERICAN POWER COMPETITION WILL PERSIST THROUGHOUT THE DECADE. THERE WILL BE CHANGES, OF COURSE. SOME OF THESE MIGHT EVEN BE FOR THE BETTER. (I SHOULD THINK THE CHANCES OF IMPROVEMENTS WOULD INCREASE IF THE CHINESE BECOME MORE MENACING.) BUT I FOR ONE WOULD BE SURPRISED IF THE STYLE OF THE SOVIET UNION'S POLICIES AND THE NATURE OF ITS AMBITIONS WERE TO ALTER IN ANY VERY FUNDAMENTAL WAY. THIS STYLE AND THESE AMBITIONS ARE, AFTER ALL, MORE THAN THE SIMPLE PRODUCT OF THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION-- THEY ARE THE EXPRESSION OF A POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE HISTORICAL PRODUCT OF RUSSIAN SOCIETY.

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